Purpose: Performance measurement systems (PMS) in Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) are more complex than in for-profit organizations. NPOs have an orientation towards social mission and values, and they consider not only organizational efficiency and viability, but also the social impact of the organization. This research provides a comprehensive synthesis of PMSs in NPOs. Design/methodology/approach: Using a literature review, supported by bibliometric and network analyses. A paper set of 240 articles related to this research field is examined. Topics that are the most (...) prevalent in this research area and their interrelationships are identified, presenting an outline of current efforts. Findings: Despite the descriptive analyses for the paper set, a framework is proposed for organizing the design-implementation factors of PMSs in nonprofit organizations, identifying the main requirements for their successful development. Originality/value: Investigation on performance measurement in nonprofit organizations is still in its early stages of development with many opportunities to further develop the field. Conceptual frameworks and models, as well as specific theories, are being generated for this field of research, and the process of adapting models from the general field of performance measurement is taking place. The meta-framework that organizes the main research topics of PMS in nonprofit organizations and the framework that consolidates factors that influence the design-implementation of PMSs in nonprofit organizations developed represents this paper contribution. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...) ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories. (shrink)

En este artículo, tengo dos objetivos distintos. En primer lugar, mostrar que no es una buena idea tener una teoría de la verdad que, aunque consistente, sea omega-inconsistente. Para discutir este punto, considero un caso particular: la teoría de Friedman-Sheard FS. Argumento que en los lenguajes de primer orden omega inconsistencia implica que la teoría de la verdad no tiene modelo estándar. Esto es, no hay un modelo cuyo dominio sea el conjunto de los números naturales en el cual esta (...) teoría de la verdad pueda tener una interpretación consistente. En ese sentido, la introducción del predicado veritativo no mantiene la ontología estándar. Además, cuando se considera un lenguaje de orden superior, la situación es aun peor. En teorías de segundo orden con semántica estándar, la misma introducción produce una teoría que no tiene modelo. Por eso, si la omega-inconsistencia es un mal síntoma, la insatisfacibilidad de una teoría es aun peor. En segundo lugar, propongo abandonar el principio de unión de teorías FSn y aceptar una extensibilidad indefinida de teorías FS0, FS1, FS2, FS3,.... De acuerdo a mi punto de vista, la secuencia de teorías tiene las mismas virtudes que FS sin sus desagradables consecuencias. In this paper, I have two different purposes. Firstly, I want to show that it's not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but omega-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: FS. I argue that in First-order languages omega-inconsistency implies that a theory of truth has not standard model. Then, there is no model whose domain is the set of natural numbers in which this theory of truth could acquire a consistent interpretation. So, in theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. I add that in Higher-order languages the situation is even worst. In second order theories with standard semantic the same introduction produces a theory that doesn't have a model. So, if an omega-inconsistent theory of truth is bad, an unsatisfiable theory is really bad. Secondly, I propose to give up the union principle of theories FSn and accept an indefinite extensibility of theories FS0, FS1, FS2, FS3,... According to my view, the sequence of theories has the same virtues of FS without its disgusting consequences. (shrink)

The present text follows three general objectives, which, at the same time, build its structure. Firstly, I would like to present and question Bernard Williams’ description of the virtue of accuracy. Secondly, I´ll try to complement Williams’ description by analyzing two dimensions of accuracy: care, on one side, and what I call “proximity to the problem”, on the other side. Related to that last issue, I add an excursus about writing. The third and last part of this article is an (...) attempt to relate the discussion about the so called virtues of truth —sincerity as well as accuracy— with the issue of self-deception. Specifically, I try to a) support Mele´s deflationary account of self-deception as motivationally biased belief, b) make an adjustment to this conception, and c) complement it with another aspect which has not received enough consideration in the discussion about self-deception, namely some beliefs we don´t generate or that manifest a high lack of accuracy. (shrink)

The logic of proofs is a refinement of modal logic introduced by Artemov in 1995 in which the modality ◻A is revisited as ⟦t⟧A where t is an expression that bears witness to the validity of A. It enjoys arithmetical soundness and completeness and is capable of reflecting its own proofs . We develop the Hypothetical Logic of Proofs, a reformulation of LP based on judgemental reasoning.

Some recent literature [Hicks, M. T. and van Elswyk. P., (2015) pp. 433-443, 2015; Bhogal, H. (2017), pp. 447-460] has argued that the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature have a same weakness as the Humean conceptions of laws of nature. That is, both conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. The argument is as follows: the Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature agree that the law statements are universal generalisations; thus, both conceptions are vulnerable to an explanatory (...) circularity problem between the laws of nature and their instances. In this paper, I argue that Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature is invulnerable to this explanatory circularity problem. (shrink)

The title and subtitle entail the main claims of this article. In the face of the present debate on the question whether Wittgenstein was a foundationalist, a coherentist, or both things, I suggest that, at least in a certain important sense, he didn’t adopt either of these positions. The point concerns the status of propositions that I characterize as “unheard-of propositions” and that constitute the most important subclass of so called “Moore-type propositions”. Unheard-of propositions (and the corresponding beliefs) are neither (...) doubted nor justified, they are not said and not even thought. We simply count on them or we take them for granted. In calling our attention on these primitive, spontaneous and instinctive certainties Wittgenstein is trying to correct an intellectualist bias in traditional conceptions of human being. This reading is confirmed through an analysis of the origin of our basic certainties: we have some of them naturally or instinctively, we acquire others by training, but in neither case there are rational processes at stake (nor irrational ones, of course). The debate between foundationalism and coherentism conceals precisely what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover: a stratum of certainties that, being objective, precede the order of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

I present one specific way of creating problematic situations: generating perplexity. A teacher with a personal history marked by a struggle to conceptualise the words of the professor or of the book, will have paved his way. The teacher develops his subject clearly. When the students say they understand, it is time to show an apparently paradoxical situation. Perplexity appears. The teacher again explains the subject and all accept again that they understand perfectly. But the difficulty doesn't disappear. The debate (...) begins. The discussion creates murmuring, noise. The perfect moment has arrived. A silent classroom would have meant the teacher's failure. Second step: "rewinding". To go back and look for the failure. The students should discover the failure, helped by the teacher. The second step finishes. Perplexities cannot always be solved, especially in the case of philosophy. When they arise from diverse proposals for a solution, it would be bad teaching to present a single way of solving the problem. Students should know that in these cases the debates are open and the discussion continues. In other cases it is just a conceptual failure in construing the corresponding notion, so the discussion should be closed once the failure is found. (shrink)

I present one specific way of creating problematic situations: generating perplexity. A teacher with a personal history marked by a struggle to conceptualise the words of the professor or of the book, will have paved his way. The teacher develops his subject clearly. When the students say they understand, it is time to show an apparently paradoxical situation. Perplexity appears. The teacher again explains the subject and all accept again that they understand perfectly. But the difficulty doesn't disappear. The debate (...) begins. The discussion creates murmuring, noise. The perfect moment has arrived. A silent classroom would have meant the teacher's failure. Second step: "rewinding". To go back and look for the failure. The students should discover the failure, helped by the teacher. The second step finishes. Perplexities cannot always be solved, especially in the case of philosophy. When they arise from diverse proposals for a solution, it would be bad teaching to present a single way of solving the problem. Students should know that in these cases the debates are open and the discussion continues. In other cases it is just a conceptual failure in construing the corresponding notion, so the discussion should be closed once the failure is found. (shrink)

This essay seeks to show that military strategists have not only been acute philosophers of space but also philosophers of world history. The works of Albert Speer, Friedrich Ratzel, A. T. Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Carl Schmitt, Guilio Duohet, and Harlan K. Ullman are considered in terms of the ways in which space has been militarized, or rather how war spatializes world history. The geography of world history has been the topos of war.

v. 1. Formación y liberación del pensamiento cubano (1515-1860). t. 1. Orígenes y formación del pensamiento cubano -- t. 2. Del liberalismo esclavista al liberalismo abolicionista.

O estresse percebido afeta diretamente a sensação de bem-estar e sabe-se que o trabalho é uma das principais fontes de estresse. Neste artigo, objetivou-se analisar a percepção de estresse e bem-estar entre trabalhadores da cidade de Franca (SP) em comparação com o restante do Brasil. Participaram 291 trabalhadores, sendo 110 de Franca (Grupo Franca – GF) e 181 do restante do Brasil (Grupo Brasil – GB). Do total amostral, a maioria foi de mulheres (67,4%) em idade economicamente ativa (75,6%), sem (...) filhos (52,92%), com ensino superior ou pós-graduação (74%), trabalhando em comércio e serviços (61,5%) e em regime celetista (55%). Os participantes responderam, on-line, a dois instrumentos para avaliar a percepção de estresse e bem-estar. Utilizou-se o teste t e correlação de Pearson para análises das variáveis estudadas. Observou-se que o bem-estar indica significativa (p ≤ 0,001) correlação negativa com a percepção de estresse na amostra como um todo (GF r = -0,40 e GB r = -0,50) e, apesar de não terem sido identificadas diferenças significativas entre os grupos, a cidade de Franca não apresentou correlação significativa com os fatores estressores relativos à carga e ao ambiente de trabalho. Todos os demais fatores estressores (financeiro, social, cognições, família, saúde e relaxamento) apresentaram correlações maiores no GB do que no GF. Os dados sugerem que, apesar de o estresse afetar diretamente a sensação de bem-estar, a vivência fora dos grandes centros urbanos, em cidades menores, parece proporcionar uma relação mais adequada com o trabalho. (shrink)

Se examinan algunas cuestiones relacionadas con el devenir causal de los seres crea-dos –en particular, los seres espirituales–, sobre la base de la noción metafísica de participación desarrollada por Tomás de Aquino. La aproximación parte de las exégesis y comentarios de Cornelio Fabro a las doctrinas tomistas.

Th e a r ticl e e xplore s h o w globalizatio n i s assumin g a pr o g ress i v e emptyin g o f the s o v ereignt y o f natio n state s i n economic , political , institutional , social , cultura l an d l e gal aspects . Th e traditiona l l e ga l institution s ar e increasing ly g i vin g ris e (...) t o n ew non-stat e re- gulato r y source s (supranational , pr iv ate , technica l an d communitarian) . Th e resul t o f this po l ycentri c r e gulato r y compl e x i s th e co e xistenc e o f a d i v ersit y o f no r mat i v e order s and jurisdiction s i n v olvin g th e e xhaustio n o f th e l e ga l paradig m aroun d w hic h th e Stat e has st r ucture d it s institutions. (shrink)

Hay usos de nombres vacíos de los que no podemos justificadamente decir que el hablante está comprometido con la existencia de un referente para el nombre en cuestión. Estos usos aparecen dentro de construcciones lingüísticas de la forma ‘X no existe', donde ‘X es un nombre vacío. Sin embargo, los hablantes logran comunicar información no trivial e incluso verdadera mediante dichos usos. Según la tradición metalingüística iniciada por R. Stalnaker (1978), una aseveración de ‘X no existe' comunica que "‘X' no (...) refiere". En este trabajo desarrollo una explicación hipotética que busca hacer avanzar esta tradición. De acuerdo con esta hipótesis, los actos de habla en cuestión son denegaciones metalingüísticas. Defiendo esta hipótesis comparándola con una propuesta metalingüística alternativa de L. Clapp (2008). There are uses of empty names where the speaker cannot justifiably be said to be committed to there being a referent for her use of the relevant name. These appear within negative existential constructions of the form ‘X doesn't exist' where ‘X' is an empty name. Yet, speakers manage to convey non-trivial and sometimes even truthful information with such uses. According to the metalinguistic tradition initiated by R. Stalnaker (1978) assertions of ‘X doesn't exist' convey the information that " ‘X doesn't refer". In this paper I develop a hypothetical account that purports to advance this tradition. On this view, these speech acts are understood as metalinguistic denials. I defend this hypothesis by comparing it against a recent metalinguistic proposal owed to L. Clapp (2008). (shrink)

Resenha de: Aspectos do Novo Radicalismo de Direita (T. W. Adorno)ADORNO, Theodor W. Aspectos do Novo Radicalismo de Direita. Tradução e apresentação de Felipe Catalani. São Paulo: Unesp, 2020. (Coleção Adorno).

By assuming a deterministic evolution of quantum systems and taking realism into account, we carefully build a hidden variable theory for Quantum Mechanics based on the notion of ontological states proposed by ’t Hooft. We view these ontological states as the ones embedded with realism and compare them to the quantum states that represent superpositions, viewing the latter as mere information of the system they describe. Such a deterministic model puts forward conditions for the applicability of Bell’s inequality: the usual (...) inequality cannot be applied to the usual experiments. We build a Bell-like inequality that can be applied to the EPR scenario and show that this inequality is always satisfied by QM. In this way we show that QM can indeed have a local interpretation, and thus meet with the causal structure imposed by the Theory of Special Relativity in a satisfying way. (shrink)

During the Winter of 2011 I visited SADAF and gave a series of talks based on the central chapters of my manuscript on the Yablo paradox. The following year, I visited again, and was pleased and honored to find out that Eduardo Barrio and six of his students had written ‘responses’ that addressed the claims and arguments found in the manuscript, as well as explored new directions in which to take the ideas and themes found there. These comments reflect (...) my thoughts on these responses (also collected in this issue), as well as my thoughts on further issues that arose during the symposium that was based on the papers and during the many hours I spent talking and working with Eduardo and his students. Durante el invierno de 2011, visité SADAF y dí una serie de conferencias sobre los capítulos centrales de mi manuscrito sobre la paradoja de Yablo. El año siguiente, visité Buenos aires nuevamente y tuve el placer y el honor de descubrir que Eduardo Barrio y seis de sus estudiantes habían escrito respuestas que abordan las afirmaciones y argumentos de mi manuscrito, además de explorar nuevas direcciones en las cuales considerar las ideas y temas encontrados allí. El presente trabajo refleja mis pensamientos sobre estas respuestas (también incluidas en este volumen), así como mis ideas sobre otras cuestiones que surgieron durante el simposio en el que se presentaron los artículos y en las muchas horas que nosotros discutimos y trabajamos con Eduardo y sus estudiantes. (shrink)

En uno de los ataques más reiterados a Darwin, que todavía subsiste en la literatura actual, se señala que la teoría de la selección natural es tautológica, analítica o, al menos, irrefutable. En docenas de artículos, diversos autores han señalado las condiciones en que la selección natural quedaría refutada, intentando mostrar que no carece de contenido empírico. La estrategia seguida en este trabajo será otra. Teniendo en cuenta que la crítica de tautologicidad o irrefutabilidad ha sido esgrimida contra leyes fundamentales (...) de otras teorías, insertaré la discusión en un marco metateórico más amplio. Para discutir el estatus del segundo principio de la mecánica clásica, Moulines introduce el concepto de "principio guía". Los principios guía no serían contrastables directamente, sino a través de especializaciones. Desde mi punto de vista, considerar a la selección natural como principio guía permitiría explicar por qué muchos la han considerado tautológica y cómo esto no implica vacuidad. One of the most repeated objections to Darwin, still present in contemporary literature, outlines that theory of natural selection is tautological, analytical or at least irrefutable. There are many authors that point out the conditions in which natural selection would be refuted, trying to prove that it doesn't lack of empirical content. This essay will work on a different strategy. Taking into account that tautological or irrefutable criticism has been put forward against other theories' fundamental laws; I will insert the argumentation in a wider theoretical frame. To argue about the status of the second principle about classic mechanical Moulines introduces the 'guiding principle' concept. The guiding principles wouldn't be directly contrastable. The only way in which they could be contrastable would be through special laws. From my point of view natural selection, considered as the guiding principle, would explain why many thinkers had considered it a tautology and how this does not imply vacuity. (shrink)

Eduardo Arroyo, Armelle Auris, François Boissonnet, Paul HENRY, Pierre-Jean LABARRIERE, MATIEU, Gilles AILLAUD, Gérad THALMANN, Nicole MATHIEU, Jacques VIMARD, Michel QUAREZ, Leonardo CREMONINI, L'atelier d'Eduardo Arryo: Le carré blanc du ring, Rue Descartes, No. 7, Logiques de l'éthique (Juin 1993), pp. 149-168.

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

This volume collects a number of important and revealing interviews with Richard Rorty, spanning more than two decades of his public intellectual commentary, engagement, and criticism. In colloquial language, Rorty discusses the relevance and nonrelevance of philosophy to American political and public life. The collection also provides a candid set of insights into Rorty's political beliefs and his commitment to the labor and union traditions in this country. Finally, the interviews reveal Rorty to be a deeply engaged social thinker and (...) observer. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Until now, North American and European philosophies have been engaged in debates about the possibility of a postmetaphysical philosophy and the consequences of the linguistic turn for the assessment of modernity; they have done so, however, without departing from the narrow horizons of their respective nationalistic perspectives. In this incisive critique, Dussel demonstrates how most of thse philosophies have either failed to give historically faithful analyses of the genesis of the "myth" of modernity, or have never engaged in a serious (...) questioning of their own Eurocentric presuppositions. He shows how North American and European philosophers have presupposed a no-longer-acceptable philosophy of history that has led them to fall into a "developmental fallacy," the belief that there is a linear sequence that moves from the premodern, underdeveloped, or on the way to industrialization, to the modern, developed, and industrialized. (shrink)

This important new volume brings together Habermas' key writing on religion and religious belief. Habermas explores the relations between Christian and Jewish thought, on the one hand, and the Western philosophical tradition on the other. In so doing, he examines a range of important figures, including Benjamin, Heidegger, Johann Baptist Metz and Gershom Scholem. In a new introduction written especially for this volume, Eduardo Mendieta places Habermas' engagement with religion in the context of his work as a whole. Mendieta (...) also discusses Habermas' writings in relation to Jewish Messianism and the Frankfurt School, showing how the essays in Religion and Rationality, one of which is translated into English for the first time, foreground an important, yet often neglected, dimension of critical theory. The volume concludes with an original extended interview, also in English for the first time, in which Habermas develops his current views on religion in modern society. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars in theology, religious studies and philosophy, as well as to all those already familiar with Habermas' work. (shrink)

El artículo busca dilucidar algunas características del epistolario en tanto que fuente historiográfica y encontrar claves de comparación con la autobiografía. Con importantes aspectos en común, sus propósitos, sus sesgos y la posición subjetiva de sus autores evidencian importantes diferencias. A partir de esta problemática, se analizará la correspondencia sostenida por Max Weber desde el servicio militar durante la Gran Guerra. En un período en el que no tiene intervención pública alguna, el análisis se centra en la evolución de su (...) perspectiva sobre el papel de Alemania y sobre su actividad específica en los lazaretos. Cada uno de estos aspectos se relaciona respectivamente con dos piedras angulares de la obra weberiana: el problema nacional y el proceso de burocratización. (shrink)

This paper deals with the ways in which jurists and law professors applied transnational systems of public law, in particular US constitutionalism and French droit administratif, in their approaches to the state building process in late nineteenth century Argentina. In covering these movements of adaptation of a nascent legal culture to changing ideological and political circumstances, this article attempts to illuminate the strong links between the process of institutionalization of certain academic disciplines or forms of social knowledge, and modern state (...) building in Latin America. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza la relación entre los conceptos de fetichismo y lucha de clases en el particular marxismo de Slavoj Žižek. Žižek comprende el fetichismo marxiano a través del psicoanálisis y en el marco de la concepción de Marx de la religión en dos sentidos: como ideología y como fundamento. Esto le permite mostrar que el fetichismo y en general el hecho religioso, no es únicamente «falsa conciencia» sino que también funciona como el elemento constitutivo e insuperable de (...) lo real, lo que, a su vez permite repensar la lucha de clases. (shrink)

This book explains how the logic of theory change employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework, iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal frameworks, and criticism of the model.